RECENT DECISIONS OF INTEREST
Oklahoma Supreme Court
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In Truelock v. Del City, 1998 OK 64, ___ P.2d ___ (Okla. 1998), the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that damages for inconvenience, annoyance, and discomfort are injuries to the person rather than to property; thus, such damages were subject to the $100,000.00 limitation of the Governmental Tort Claims Act. Furthermore, because the plaintiff’s claim for attorney’s fees was part of their claim arising out of the defendant’s negligence, such attorney’s fees are included within the damage limitation of the Act. Consequently, because plaintiff’s received the maximum amount of damages available under the Act, additional attorney’s fees were not available. |
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In Bratcher v. State Farm, 1998 OK 63, ___ P.2d ___ (Okla. 1998), the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that a clause in a replacement cost option to a renter’s insurance contract that provides for loss settlement on an actual cash value basis if the property is not replaced in one year was not unconscionable. In overruling Coblenz v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., the court stated that the equitable concept of unconscionability should not be used as an aid in interpreting the provisions of homeowner’s insurance contracts. Insurance contracts are considered one-sided, and should be construed against the insurer. |
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In Stout v. Wollman, 1998 OK 54, ___ P. 2d ___ (Okla. 1998), the Supreme Court of Oklahoma applied the rule articulated in the recent case Mill v. Grother, and held that, in a medical malpractice action, the trial court should not have excluded evidence that the defendant’s expert witness was on the Board of Directors at defendant’s insurance company. Because of the high degree of connection between the expert and the insurer, it is likely that the expert may be biased; therefore, evidence of such connection is admissible. |
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In Prudential v. Glass, 1998 OK 52, 959 P. 2d 586 (Okla. 1998), the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that, in a suit between family members of a deceased for insurance proceeds, neither party was entitled to summary judgment. Because the deceased’s brother claimed that he received an assignment of the proceeds in order to repay a loan, this created an issue of material fact as to how much debt was outstanding on such loan, and summary judgment for the brother was not proper. Furthermore, while the assignment was not a complete recitation of the entire agreement, it was clear and unambiguous; thus, summary judgment for the children of the deceased would have deprived the brother of a vested interest in the proceeds. |
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In XAE Corp. v. SMR Property, 1998 OK 51, ___ P. 2d ___ (Okla. 1998), the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that the implied covenant to market is not enforceable by owners of an overriding royalty interest who were granted their interest in-kind and where the assignment imposed no express obligation on the lessee to market his interest. Because a grant of an overriding royalty interest is not a leasing transaction, but more of a grantor/grantee relationship, there is no basis for concluding that the grantor would owe the grantee any duties regarding development. Here, with an absence of an express covenant to develop and no special circumstances suggesting development as the object of the sale, the grantor has no duty to the owner of the overriding royalty interest to make the product marketable. |
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In Sullivan v. Forty Second West, 1998 OK 48, ___ P. 2d ___ (Okla. 1998), the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that fundamental errors are reviewable even in the absence of addressing such error on appeal. Fundamental error compromises the integrity of the proceeding to the extent that it has a substantial effect on the rights of the parties. Consequently, although lack of an objection to alleged error severely limits appellate review, it is within the purview of the court to review for fundamental error. However, in this landlord-tenant dispute, the court found no fundamental error in the omission of a jury instruction regarding the commercial reasonableness of the landlord’s action. In the case at bar, commercial reasonableness did not appear to be an issue developed in any detail; thus, fundamental error did not occur. |
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In First Bank of Okarche v. Lepak, 1998 OK 46, ___ P. 2d ___ (Okla. 1998), the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that Okla. Stat. tit. 12A, §9-307.1 et seq., enacted in compliance with the federal Food Security Act (7 U.S.C. §1631), is not a strict liability statute. Furthermore, the court held that the federal Food Security Act does not preempt the common law defenses to conversion in cases arising under it. The Act lacks any express language or any indication that it conflicts with state common law making it impossible to comply with both. In terms of Oklahoma law, if a secured party has authorized disposition of collateral which it has an interest in, then one of the elements of conversion has not been met. Thus, the trial judge erred in concluding that the Oklahoma statute created strict liability and destroyed the defense of actual or implied authorization. In addition, the defenses of waiver and estoppel have been available to buyers who could show that the lender acquiesced in selling practices that may impair its security interest. |
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In Tulsa County Deputy v. Board of County Commissioners, 1998 OK 44, ___ P. 2d ___ (Okla. 1998), the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the Tulsa County Criminal Justice Authority, a public trust designed to provide for the construction and operation of a new jail, was created under the proper statute. While Okla. Stat. tit. 19, §§904.1-904.10 do not authorize a trust with the authority to issue revenue bonds, Okla. Stat. tit. 60, §178 does provide for such a trust. Under the court’s rationale, Tulsa County was not limited to the title 19 jail trust authority; it was free to utilize any method provided by the legislature, including title 60 |
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In In Re: Matter of Tax Levy of Ardmore, 1998 OK 43, 959 P. 2d 580 (Okla. 1998), the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the state has the power to conduct a second election for a building levy that failed in the same year. The court stated that the constitutionally-granted power to hold an election for a school levy is self-executing and does not need legislation to carry it into effect. In addition, with both constitutional provisions and statutes, the court emphasized that the plain language of the provision or statute should be analyzed to ascertain legislative intent. |
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In Williams v. Tulsa Motels, 1998 OK 42, 958 P. 2d 1282 (Okla. 1998), the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the Court of Civil Appeals should not have considered a fact not in dispute when reversing a summary judgment ruling. After the District Court granted summary judgment for the defendant, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed, basing its decision on a fact that the plaintiff had not relied on nor referred to in his brief in opposition to summary judgment. Because the fact was not in dispute, the Supreme Court held that summary judgment was proper. |
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In Porter v. Ferrell, 1998 OK 41, 959 P. 2d 576 (Okla. 1998), the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that, by applying Okla. Stat. tit. 51 §24.1, a state employee who pleaded nolo contendre to a felony forfeited all benefits of employment. In the decision, the court vacated the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals, which held that the Oklahoma Personnel Act (Okla. Stat. tit. 74 §840-6.5) took precedence over §24.1. Stressing that harmony, not confusion, must be sought in statutory construction, the court ruled that the two statutes were compatible. |
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In Drllvich v. Stock, 1998 OK 39, 958 P. 2d 1277 (Okla. 1998), the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that when a foreign judgment is refiled in Oklahoma, Oklahoma’s dormancy statute (Okla. Stat. tit. 12 §735) does not bar recovery, and the refiling creates a new Oklahoma judgment which is governed by the Oklahoma statute of limitations. Citing cases from numerous states which followed this majority view, the court overruled its minority position concerning the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (Okla. Sta. tit. 12 §719). |
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Matter of Guardianship of M.R.S., 1998 OK 38, ___ P. 2d ___ (Okla. 1998), the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a father met the burden of proof required to regain custody of his daughter from her guardian. This case presented the court with the issue of the standard of proof required to terminate the guardianship of a minor. The father, who was never found unfit, need only show proof of changed circumstances which would allow him to provide a family home for the child. In reversing the trial court, which held that the father failed to prove substantial and material change by clear and convincing evidence, the court stressed a "parental preference" to place a child with its natural parents whenever possible. |
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In Ethics Commission v. Keating, 1998 OK 36, 958 P. 2d 1250 (Okla. 1998), the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that Oklahoma law permits the Governor to use state-owned vehicles for transportation to fundraisers. Although the Ethics Commission rule prohibiting use of public property in solicitation of funds does appear to apply, an exception to that rule, allowing transportation for activities that are a part of the ordinary conduct of the governmental entity, is also applicable. Furthermore, an overriding statute (Okla. Stat. tit. 47, §2-101) indicates no limitation upon the Governor’s use of public transportation to attend fundraising events. |
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In Mills v. Grotheer, 1998 OK 33, 957 P. 2d 940 (Okla. 1998), a medical malpractice case, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the trial court had not abused its discretion by not admitting evidence of an expert’s membership in the defendant’s medical malpractice insurance company. By adopting the "connections test", the court ruled that an expert must have more connection with a defendant’s insurance company than a mere policy or membership in order for the evidence to be admissible. The rationale for such holding was that the defendant’s expert did not have any direct financial interest in the outcome, such as an agent or employee of the company would. |
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In Gaylord Entertainment v. Thompson, 1998 OK 30, 958 P.25 128 (Okla. 1998), the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the constitutional shield surrounding the freedom of political speech protected a newspaper from the burden of defending themselves against claims of libel by the plaintiffs, and, thus, the case was properly dismissed. Furthermore, the court held that the privilege of fair-report (Okla. Stat. tit. 12, §1443.1) protected newspaper editorial coverage of lawmaking already in progress. In its opinion, the court emphasized the importance of political speech, stating that it must be more intensely guarded than any other form of permissible expression. Media coverage and discussion of issues of governmental interest allow the public to make informed decisions, and this is essential for an effective democracy. |
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